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A THEORY OF WEALTH AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Keith N. Hylton*
ABSTRACT

One recurring problem in the punitive damages case law is the
degree to which the wealth of the defendant should matter in the
determination of a punitive award. Intuition suggests that the
wealthy should pay more than the nonwealthy. On the other hand,
the view has been expressed that wealth should not play a role in
the determination of a punitive award. I will use examples to
develop several arguments. The claim that wealth is seldom
relevant to the determination of a punitive award is unsupportable.
The key proposition advanced in this paper is that the defendant's
wealth is relevant when either the victim's loss or the defendant's
gain from wrongdoing is unobservable and correlated with the
defendant's wealth. Since the victim's loss typically will be
observable, wealth will tend to be a relevant factor when optimal
deterrence requires elimination of the defendant's gain.

* Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar, Boston University,
knhylton@bu.edu. I thank participants in the Widener University School of Law
Crimtorts Symposium for helpful comments.
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1. INTRODUCTION

One recurring problem in the punitive damages case law is the
degree to which the wealth of the defendant should matter in the
determination of a punitive award.' In other words, given some
reprehensible act that would merit a punitive damages award under
the law, should the amount of the award vary with the defendant's
wealth? Should deep-pocket defendants pay more than those with
shallow pockets?
It may seem intuitive that wealthy defendants should pay more
than the nonwealthy. A six-figure punitive judgment against a
multi-billionaire would have the same deterrent impact as a
parking ticket to the average person. 2 And it seems intuitively
undesirable to have a class of potential defendants who view
punitive judgments as most of us view parking tickets-that is, as a
nuisance fine that we have to pay occasionally but do not view as
so threatening as to prevent us from committing the violation that
generated the fine. I think we all share the view that the acts that
typically result in punitive judgments in court should be
completely deterred; and if we were to discover that among a class
of fabulously wealthy, punitive judgments were viewed as nothing
more than nuisance fines, leaving it to their discretion or caprice

whether to comply with the law, we would consider it a serious
failure of the legal system.
On the other hand, the view has been expressed that wealth
should not play a significant role in the determination of a punitive

1In

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.

408 (2003), the Supreme Court said that "[t]he wealth of a defendant cannot
justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award." Id. at 427. Since
it is obvious that no court can legally "justify" or affirm an unconstitutional
award, the Court's statement could be understood as a direction to lower courts
that they should not use wealth as the primary basis for determining a punitive

award.

Moreover, the marginal utility of a dollar of wealth probably falls as
wealth increases. If punishment is designed to inflict a certain loss in utility on
the actor, it follows that the wealthy actor should be assessed a larger monetary
penalty than the nonwealthy actor. Although this is a somewhat technical form
of the argument, I think it is still consistent with common intuition.
2
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judgment.3 If we limit the role of punitive judgments to
internalizing the social costs of offensive conduct, then an
economically rigorous argument can be offered for ignoring the
wealth of the defendant. Under this view, if the defendant imposes
a loss of $100 on a plaintiff and an additional loss of $200 on
society, the compensatory award should be set at $100 and the
punitive award at $200. In this approach, the compensatory and the
punitive award, which together internalize the full social costs of
the defendant's conduct, are both independent of the wealth of the
defendant. 4 The multi-billionaire and the pauper pay the same
punitive judgment.
The argument against taking wealth into account can be put on
a broader platform. Suppose an interest in a certain sum of money
is what drives the defendant to commit his reprehensible acts. If
the defendant is driven by a desire to obtain a definable profit or to
avoid a definable cost, the punitive judgment can be set at a level
that prevents the defendant from obtaining that profit or avoiding
that cost. As long as the profit or cost can be defined independently
of the defendant's wealth, there should not be a need to consider or
even to know the defendant's wealth when determining the proper
punitive award.
These are straightforward arguments, but they take us into a
vast literature on the theory of damages, 6 a literature that consists
3 Amicus Curiae Brief of A. Mitchell Polinsky et al. in Support of

Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 051256), 2006 WL 2153766 [hereinafter Polinsky Brief]; Kenneth S. Abraham &
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the Rule of Law: The Role of
Defendant's Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415,415 (1989).
4 This example is based on the argument of Abraham & Jeffries, supra note
3.
5 Polinsky Brief, supra note 3, at 7-8 (arguing that wealth should not play a
role if the injurer acts with a monetary [in contrast to nonmonetary] interest in
mind). I focus on instrumentalist arguments in the text of this paper. The moral
arguments for punishment would appear to open more questions about the role
of wealth in the determination of a punitive award. If punitive damages should
be levied only as retribution for some serious moral failure, then it is not clear
why wealth should matter at all to punishment. The moral failure is determined
by the act, not by the actor's wealth. See, e.g., Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 3,
at 422-23.
6 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory
of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998) (proposing an alternative approach to that
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of instrumentalist and moral arguments. 7 I will not attempt to
review the literature here. My approach is thoroughly
instrumentalist. Rather than leading with theory, I prefer to employ
straightforward arguments and examples. This may seem to be ad
hoc and casuistic, but it identifies and illustrates the limits of
sweeping theoretical claims about the relevance of wealth in
punishment.
I will use simple examples to develop several arguments. First,
the claim that the wealth of the defendant is never relevant, or
seldom relevant, in the determination of a punitive judgment is
unsupportable. To be sure, one can conjure examples in which
wealth is not relevant. But as a general proposition, wealth is
relevant in the determination of a punitive award. Second, the more
interesting questions involve when and under what conditions
wealth will be relevant in determining a punitive judgment. Not a
great deal of attention has been given to this question. I hope to at
least set out the outlines here of a theory of wealth and damages.
The key proposition advanced in this paper is that the wealth
of the defendant is relevant in the determination of a punitive
award when either the victim's loss or the defendant's gain from
wrongdoing is unobservable and correlated with the defendant's
wealth. Since the victim's loss typically will be observable, wealth
will tend to be a relevant factor when optimal deterrence requires
the elimination of the defendant's gain from wrongdoing.

of Polinsky and Shavell, focusing on the offender's gain and victim's loss); A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998) (proposing that the focus should be on deterrence
and punishment).
7 For the instrumentalist literature, see, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Should
Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); David D.
Friedman, Reflections on Optimal Punishment, Or: Should the Rich Pay Higher
Fines?, 3 REs. L. & ECON. 185 (1981); Hylton, supra note 6; A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies
Among Individuals, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 618 (1991); Polinsky & Shavell, supra
note 6. For the moral literature on punitive damages, see, e.g., Anthony J.
Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957 (2007);
Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105
(2005).
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II. SOME EXAMPLES
I will start with a set of simple examples to flesh out the issues
raised by variations in the defendant's wealth in the damages
context. I will use the terms "injurer" and "defendant"
interchangeably and the same with the terms "victim" and
"plaintiff."
First, consider the case in which the injurer deliberately
destroys the flower garden of the victim solely to harvest a spiteful
pleasure. 8 To provide a concrete visual description, suppose the
injurer drives his sport utility vehicle over the victim's extensive
and painstakingly developed flower garden several times in order
to make sure that he has destroyed it completely. Should the
defendant's wealth matter in this case? It has been suggested that
the injurer's wealth should matter in this case
because a wealthy
9
fine.
small
a
by
deterred
be
not
actor would
Second, suppose the injurer commits the same wrong, but
entirely by accident. Unaware of the location of the victim's flower
garden, the injurer drives his sport utility vehicle over it several
times as he tries to make room for a group of bikers passing
through his neighborhood. Should the injurer's wealth matter in
this case, and should this case be treated differently from the first
one?
Third, suppose the injurer walks over to the victim's property
and steals several of the most impressive flowers from the victim's
garden and brings the flowers home to put them in pots where he
can see them up close. He destroys part of the victim's garden, but
not for a spiteful pleasure this time. He gains nothing from
knowing that he has injured the victim. He wants only to enjoy the
flowers from a closer perspective. Should this case be treated
differently from the first case?
Fourth, suppose the injurer steals flowers from the victim's
garden in order to sell them to a third party. He discovers that the
flowers are valuable to the third party and seeks to make a
substantial profit from selling them.

8 This example is taken from the Polinsky Brief, supra note 3, at 7.
9Id.

932

WIDENER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

Fifth, suppose the invader (defendant) parks his car in the
victims' garages. He owns a valuable car, and he does not want it
to be scratched or damaged by the weather. The invader could have
parked his car in a commercial garage for a moderate fee.
Should the wealth of the defendant matter in the determination
of a punitive judgment, if there is a punitive judgment, in any of
these cases?
After examining these cases, I will consider the case of
corporate actors. One might argue that the wealth of a corporate
actor should matter less in the punishment determination than the
case of an individual actor.' 0 Suppose, for example, the corporation
steals an asset from a victim. How should the defendant's wealth
be measured, or in what sense is it relevant, in the case of a
corporate actor? Does the fact that the actor is a corporation
require any modifications of the arguments developed for the case
of individuals?
III. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGE AWARDS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR WEALTH

In order to decide whether wealth is relevant in the
determination of a punitive award, we first have to determine the
goal or purpose of the punitive award. The literature has so far
identified two general goals for punitive awards.
One goal is to internalize the losses borne by society as a
result of the defendant's conduct.1 ' If the defendant imposes a loss
of $100 on the plaintiff and an additional loss of $200 on society,
the internalization goal would require a compensatory award of
$100 and a punitive judgment of $200.
An alternative goal for the punitive judgment is to eliminate
the gain from the defendant's conduct. Thus, if the defendant
imposes a loss of $100 on the plaintiff and at the same time gains
$500 from his conduct, the gain-elimination approach would
require a compensatory award of $100 and a punitive award of at
10Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 3, at 421-24; Polinsky Brief, supra note

3, at8.

" See, e.g.,

Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal

Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003); see also Hylton, supra note 6; Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 6.
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least $400. With a compensatory award of $100 and a punitive
award of $400, the defendant would pay a judgment of $500,
which would be just sufficient to eliminate the gain from his
conduct.
The two goals are really antecedent to larger goals. For both
goals, the ultimate aim is to minimize overall social costs or,
equivalently, to maximize social welfare. In the setting in which
internalization is the goal, overall social costs are minimized by
creating incentives for efficient precaution. If the injurer's conduct
imposes a loss on society of $300, overall social costs will be
minimized if we can set up a system that induces the injurer to
incur precaution costs as long as they total less than $300. The
internalization approach avoids creating incentives for the injurer
to spend $400 in order to avoid imposing a cost on society of $300.
The internalization approach does not aim to eliminate the injurer's
activity altogether, but to find the efficient scale. This is a sensible
approach when the injurer's activity generates benefits to society
that exceed its social costs.
For example, suppose the injurer's activity is driving. Suppose
that during a given week of driving, the injurer gains $500 per mile
over the first 100 miles and $200 per mile from the next 100 miles.
At the same time, the injurer's activity imposes costs on society.
The expected cost to immediate accident victims is $100 per mile.
There is also a pollution cost of $200 per mile. It follows that the
full cost of the injurer's activity is $300 per mile. Including a
punitive judgment to internalize pollution costs would lead the
actor to maintain his activity at 100 miles per week. 12 This
approach minimizes overall social costs.
In the case of gain elimination, the intermediate aim of the
penalty is to completely deter the defendant's activity-to drive its
frequency to zero, rather than to some optimal level. In the driving
example just considered, if we impose damages sufficient to
eliminate the $500 gain to the injurer, that would eliminate the

12

If the injurer increased his activity to 110 miles per week, he would

enjoy a gain on the margin of $200 per mile for the last ten miles, but would also
suffer a loss of $300 for those miles. His net gain over the last ten miles would
be -$100. The injurer would improve his welfare by reducing his activity to

$100 miles per week or less.

WIDENER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

injurer's activity altogether. The goal of the gain-elimination
penalty is to maximize welfare, just like the internalization penalty.
But the gain-eliminating penalty maximizes welfare by driving the
injurer's activity to zero.
Now, one could get complete deterrence through an
internalization-based system. Suppose, in the driving example just
considered, the pollution cost of the injurer's activity is $500 per
mile. If the punitive award is structured to internalize the $500-permile-pollution cost, this would drive up the defendant's per-mile
cost to $600 (the sum of compensation to accident victims and
pollution victims). Facing a per-mile cost of $600 and a per-mile
gain of $500, the potential defendant would forgo the activity of
driving (i.e., set his activity level at zero).
Given that internalization will sometimes accomplish the goal
of complete deterrence, one might argue, as Gary Becker did many
years ago, 13 that we can simply do without gain-eliminating
penalties. We can pursue the goal of cost internalization
exclusively and let that goal generate complete deterrence when
that is implicated by the realized costs and benefits.
The problem with this solution was first recognized in the
Calabresi and Melamed article on property rules and liability
rules. 14 It is true that the cost-internalization approach will
eliminate gains and accomplish the complete deterrence goal
whenever (external) costs exceed (internal) gains. But there are
instances in which the cost-internalization approach fails to
generate the socially optimal outcome.
The first such instance is when the potential injurer interacts
with the potential victim in a low-transaction-costsetting. In this
instance, the potential injurer can bargain with the potential victim
before taking an action that imposes a loss on the potential victim.
Since market transactions are cheaper than litigation and more
accurate in allocating resources efficiently, society should have a
strong preference for the potential injurer to bargain with the

13Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.

POL. ECON. 169 (1968).

14 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability

Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089
(1972).
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potential victim, rather than acting in an injurious manner and
dealing with a lawsuit later. For example, rather than take the
flowers from his neighbor's garden and respond to some legal
proceeding later, the injurer can simply offer a price to the victim
and see whether a deal can be struck between them.
When transaction costs are low, society prefers actors to use
the market. Overall social welfare is maximized through the use of
market transactions ex ante (before the transfer of an entitlement)
rather than ex post litigation.
Given this, gain eliminating, rather than cost-internalizing
penalties, should be used whenever injurers bypass the market in
low-transaction-cost settings. If the injurer takes valuable flowers
from the victim, the penalty should be set at a level that eliminates
the injurer's gain rather than internalizing the victim's loss. The
reason is that if the penalty is designed merely to internalize the
victim's loss, some injurers may find it profitable to steal flowers.
For example, if the injurer gets a gain of $1,000 from stealing
flowers and the victim loses flowers that are worth only $100 to
him, a system of cost-internalizing penalties will fail to encourage
the potential injurers to use the market.
The second instance in which the cost-internalization approach
may fail is when the potential injurer's activity is, from society's
perspective, simply not worth the candle. There are some activities
that impose large costs on society and the benefits are clearly
insufficient to justify the costs. For example, suppose the injurer
enjoys playing with loaded guns on crowded buses. Or suppose the
injurer enjoys speeding in the opposite direction on crowded
highways. The eventual compensatory damage awards may be
substantial and sufficient to eliminate any gains enjoyed by the
injurer. But why wait for this level of internalization to occur when
it is obvious to everyone that the costs of the defendant's activity
far outweigh any objective measurement of the benefits? The
injurer's activity should be completely deterred, and that should be
the goal of any punitive judgment.
The philosophically oriented might argue that this second
category should not be recognized because of the possible
existence of "utility monsters," people who gain near infinite utility
from engaging in conduct that few of us would consider especially
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enjoyable. 15 According to this view, if the potential defendant who
plays with guns on crowded buses enjoys a near infinite level of
utility, his conduct should be not completely deterred. But law has
to work in the real world, and it may be nearly infinitely costly to
distinguish utility monsters from ordinary people. An
administratively reasonable system would balance the costs of
false convictions against the costs of false acquittals. A judgment
to apply the complete-deterrence approach to whole swaths of
activity, for which the costs are both great and far in excess of the
estimated benefits, is entirely rational.
One can evaluate the role of wealth in a system of punitive
damages in light of the foregoing theory. Under the costinternalization approach, the optimal punitive damage award will
be determined by external costs (victims' losses). The optimal
punitive award will be a function of the defendant's wealth only
when the external costs are a function of the injurer's wealth. It
follows that where the external costs are directly observable and
measurable, there should be little need to use information on the
defendant's wealth. Information on the defendant's wealth becomes
relevant to the determination of a punitive award only when the
external costs are not observable and wealth can be used as a proxy
or to help estimate external costs. Since in most cases the external
costs will be directly observable, information on the defendant's
wealth will not be necessary: the billionaire and the pauper will
pay the same amount of damages.
Under the gain-elimination approach, the optimal punitive
award will be determined by the defendant's gain from
wrongdoing-the minimum award will be equal to the gain. Where
the gain is directly observable and measurable, it will not be
necessary to have information on the defendant's wealth. Where
the gain is not observable and is correlated with the defendant's
wealth, information on wealth will be useful in determining the
optimal punitive award.
The most important difference between the costinternalization and gain-elimination approaches is that the
"parameter of interest" is more likely to be unobservable under the
gain-elimination approach. The parameter of interest under the
15

See ROBERT NOZICK,

ANARCHY, STATE, AND

UTOPIA 37 (1974).
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gain-elimination approach is the defendant's gain. In many cases,
the gain will be unobservable and also correlated with the
defendant's wealth. For example, if the defendant takes an
entitlement of the victim that he values for consumption purposes,
his valuation or willingness to pay for the entitlement may be
affected by his wealth. In those cases the defendant's wealth will
be relevant in the determination of an optimal punitive damages
award.
This suggests a general proposition:
Where the parameterof interest in the determinationof an optimal
punitive award,external cost or internalgain, is unobservable and
correlated with the defendant's wealth, the optimal punitive award
will be a function of the defendant's wealth.
Knowing that the optimal punitive award for deterrence
purposes is a function of the defendant's wealth does not tell us
whether it is an increasing or decreasing function. Common
intuition would suggest that it is an increasing function. But
common intuition may be incorrect.
If the optimal penalty is one that strips defendant's gains, then
wealth is relevant to the determination of the penalty if the gains
are unobservable and correlated with wealth. However, the
correlation could be negative or positive. For example, suppose the
injurer takes some object from the victim. If the object of desire to
the defendant is an inferior good, in the sense that the defendant's
valuation of it declines as his wealth increases, then the correlation
between wealth and gain will be negative. On the other hand, if the
object of desire is a normal good, in the sense that the defendant's
valuation of it increases as his wealth increases, the correlation
between wealth and gain will be positive.
One can offer a general statement for the case of a gaineliminating penalty. Let us define the outcome or event that
generates the defendant's gain as the desideratum of the defendant's
act. For example, if the injurer steals the victim's flowers in order
to enjoy them up close, the outcome in which the injurer enjoys the
stolen flowers at home is the desideratum of his act. Or, if the
injurer destroys the victim's flowers, the outcome in which he has
destroyed the flowers is the desideratum of his act. As a general
rule, if the defendant's valuation of the desideratum of his act is
unobservable and increasing (decreasing) in his wealth, the

938

WIDENER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

optimal punitive judgment will be increasing (decreasing) in the
defendant's wealth.
In the remainder, I will return to the examples presented
earlier.
IV. APPLICATIONS

A. Example 1
Recall that in the first example, the injurer deliberately
destroys a garden that belongs to the victim, for no other reason
than spiteful pleasure. Common intuition would hold that wealth
should be relevant in the determination of a punitive damages
award in this case, and16that the punitive award should increase in
the defendant's wealth.
The foregoing analysis suggests that this case is more
complicated than the standard intuitive approach. First, it is not
absolutely clear that wealth should play a role in this example. The
proper penalty should be determined by examining the injurer's
gain from his act: the difference between the payoffs when the
injurer destroys the victim's garden and when he refrains from
doing so. If the payoff spread is independent of wealth, then it
would be incorrect to conclude that wealth should be a factor in
determining the punitive award.
In order to examine the payoff spread, we need to determine
the injurer's gain from destroying the flowers. If the penalty is at
least as large as that gain, then it will be sufficient to deter the
injurer. The key question is whether the penalty should vary with
the injurer's wealth.
The reason wealth is likely to be a factor in the optimal
punitive award in this example is that we cannot observe the
injurer's gain, and that gain is likely to be correlated with the
injurer's wealth. His gain is equal to the maximum he would be
willing to pay to impose this particular loss-destruction of the
garden-on the victim. There are no available objective signals of
the injurer's gain in this case. However, it is highly plausible that
the injurer's gain is correlated with his wealth.

16

See, e.g., Polinsky Brief, supra note 3, at 7.
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If the spiteful pleasure the injurer enjoys from knowing that
the victim's garden has been destroyed is a normal good, then the
injurer will be willing to pay more for the destruction as his wealth
increases. The optimal punitive award will therefore be positively
correlated with the defendant's wealth. If the injurer's valuation of
the spiteful pleasure from destruction is an inferior good, then the
optimal punitive award will be negatively correlated with the
defendant's wealth.
In general, we will be unable to tell whether the injurer's
spiteful pleasure from destruction is a normal good or an inferior
good. At some level of wealth, the pleasure from destruction
probably becomes an inferior good. If we consider the reputational
effect of information spreading about the injurer's activity as a
potential cost to the injurer, then it is possible that the pleasure
from destruction starts to fall with wealth beyond a certain level.
As an injurer's increasing wealth pushes him into the class of
famous and fabulously wealthy-famous because of wealth-he
may experience a decline in his valuation of the spiteful pleasure
of destruction. His willingness to pay for that spiteful pleasure
could decline with his wealth as he crosses into the class of the
famous and wealthy. To make this argument clearer, suppose the
valuation the injurer attaches to destruction is $10,000 when his
wealth level is $5 million, and $12,000 when his wealth level is
$100 million. On the other hand, the reputational effect of his bad
conduct is $5,000 when his wealth is $5 million and $10,000 when
his wealth is $100 million. The injurer's net gain from his
destruction is, therefore, $5,000 when his wealth level is $5 million
and $2,000 when his wealth level is $100 million. Since the
injurer's valuation of the destructive act falls as his wealth
increases, there would be no need for deterrence purposes to
impose a larger penalty on the injurer when his wealth level is
$100 million than when his wealth level is $5 million.
The previous example treats reputation as a factor, like a price,
that alters the injurer's incentives. However, one could offer a
simpler explanation for the inferiority of the injurer's valuation of
destruction. One could argue that as the injurer's wealth increases,
he finds that he prefers to spend it on luxury goods rather than on
destruction.
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Still, in the absence of objective measures of the correlation
between wealth and the spiteful pleasure from destruction, the
most plausible assumption is that it is a normal good like most
others. In the absence of any reason to assume that the injurer's
desideratum is an inferior good, the optimal punitive award in the
case of destroying the neighbor's flower garden should increase
with wealth.
B. Example 2
In this example the injurer destroys the victim's garden by
accident, as he maneuvers his car in order to make room for a
passing group of bicycle riders. The injurer's activity is entirely
normal and one that society has no interest in completely deterring.
Given this, the goal of any damage award should be to internalize
the losses of victims rather than to completely deter the injurer's
activity.
The victim's loss might be positively correlated with the
injurer's wealth. The weight of the injurer's car may be a function
of his wealth-as the injurer's wealth increases he may be inclined
to buy a more expensive and heavier car. A heavier car results in
more damage to the victim's flower garden.
However, the usefulness of information on the defendant's
wealth should be quite limited in this scenario. The victim's loss
usually will be directly measurable. If it is not directly measurable,
it might be estimated by information on the weight of the car. The
defendant's wealth becomes relevant in this scenario only if the
direct loss to the victim is unobservable (there is no way to tell
how extensive the garden was before the accident), and other
signals of the degree of harm (e.g., weight of the car) are also
unobservable. Under these conditions, wealth might be useful as a
proxy for the victim's loss. But this would be an unusual case. And
even if these conditions were realized, it is unlikely that a court
would opt to use such an imprecise proxy as wealth in order to
estimate the loss suffered by the victim.
One might argue that this scenario is unhelpful to the analysis
because there really is no case for an award that goes beyond the
compensatory level. One could modify the example to include
some additional external cost suffered by society. For example,
suppose the injurer frequently experiences the same accident with
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other victims and only half of them sue for the loss suffered. If the
loss suffered is the same in each case, a proper damage award on
deterrence grounds would internalize the losses suffered by
society. This would require a multiplier of two in every lawsuit
brought by a victim for accidental destruction of a garden.' 7 Half
of the damage judgment would consist of the compensatory
portion, and the other half would consist of the punitive portion.
In this modified scenario, wealth will again be correlated with
the external cost of the injurer's activity. If the injurer's wealth is
correlated with the weight of his car, the total external cost of the
defendant's activity will be correlated with his wealth. But it would
be an unlikely setting in which the court could not find a direct
measure of the external losses.
These scenarios suggest that when loss internalization is the
proper goal for deterrence purposes, the wealth of the injurer
usually will not be relevant to the determination of a damage
award. Direct measures of the social loss will generally be
available. Where they are not available, there will be more precise
proxies available than the wealth of the injurer. Wealth may be
positively correlated to the proper award for deterrence purposes,
but it will seldom, if ever, be useful in the calculation of an award.
C. Example 3
Now suppose the injurer steals the victim's flowers to look at
them up close in his own home. This is a version of the first
example. Instead of hurting the victim in order to harvest a spiteful
pleasure, the injurer takes from the victim in order to harvest the
pleasure of enjoying the stolen property. The acts are different, but
on utilitarian grounds the first example and this example are
similar.

17 Since only half of the victims bring suit, the expected liability following

any particular violation would be half of the actual loss suffered by the victim.
In order to internalize the full loss suffered by the victim, it would be necessary
to apply a multiplier of two to the victim's compensatory damage award. For an
argument that punitive damages should be based on the multiplier principle, see
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6. For a critical view of the multiplier principle,
in the context of damages, see Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The
Multiplier Principleand Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2185 (1999).
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The pleasure of enjoying flowers is likely to be a normal good,
and there is plenty of market data to suggest that it is. The demand
for flowers increases with income.1 8 The wealthy obviously have a
greater demand to use them as decorations or as gifts. In
comparison to the first example, in which the injurer destroys the
victim's flowers, this case is more likely to be one in which the
optimal punitive award is positively correlated with wealth.
The link between wealth and the punitive award could be
defined further in this case. One could use the market data
available on income and flower purchases to estimate the extent to
which willingness to pay for flowers increases with income, and
perhaps wealth as well. Suppose an econometric study showed that
the willingness to pay for flowers increases $1 for every $1,000
increment in wealth beyond the average level. A court could use
this information to schedule punitive awards based on wealth. If
the defendant's wealth level is $1 million above the average, the
punitive award should be increased by $1,000 above the level for a
defendant of average wealth.
Obviously, this example is infected with the same imprecision
that is observed in the first example. One cannot use wealth to
arrive at a precise estimate of the injurer's gain, and finding a
precise estimate of gain would enable a court to accurately set the
punitive award at a level that eliminates the gain. But in this case,
unlike the first example, there is no direct measure of the gain, nor
is there any single quantitative proxy that clearly would be superior
to wealth. One alternative to using wealth as a single quantitative
proxy would be to use a hedonic regression equation to estimate
the injurer's gain in the particular case before the court. But this
might suffer from imprecision as well, given the unlikelihood of
finding a useful sample, and the administrative costs could be
prohibitive. The penalty designer is therefore forced, as practical
matter, to choose between using wealth as a proxy for gain and
forgoing any effort to determine a gain-eliminating judgment. As

18 Common intuition would suggest this, since flowers are purchased with
discretionary income. For validation, see, e.g., Jason Baker, Flower Industry in
Bloom, with Buds, SMARTCOMPANY.COM, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.
smartcompany.com.au/Premium-Articles/Industry-Trends/20080214-Flowerretailing-industry-trends.html.

2008]

A THEORY OF WEALTH AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES

943

long as the injurer's conduct is of the type that society should wish
to see completely deterred, it appears preferable to use wealth as an
index of gain.
D. Example 4
The final variation on stealing flowers is the case of stealing
them to sell them to a third party. Suppose the third party is willing
to pay $1,000 for each flower, because the third party has an
unusual and special interest in the flowers. The injurer steals thirty
flowers from the victim.
The injurer's gain is locked in at $30,000. In this case, a
penalty of at least $30,000 will be sufficient to deter the
defendant's conduct. Suppose the plaintiff loses $100 as a result of
the theft because the plaintiff would have never discovered the
existence of the third party on his own. The optimal judgment is a
$100 compensatory award and a punitive judgment of at least
$29,900.
In this example, the wealth of the injurer should play no role
in the determination of the punitive award. The reason is that the
gain to the injurer is determined by an objective exogenously
determined price.
The general statement that follows from this example is that
whenever the gain to the injurer from an act that should be
completely deterred is determined by an exogenously determined
monetary sum, there is no reason to use the injurer's wealth in the
determination of a punitive judgment.
The simplicity of this example is easily destroyed by altering
it to assume that the injurer enjoys the act of stealing or the
knowledge that the flowers he sells are stolen. This modification
would return us the issues confronted in the first example.
E. Example 5
Now the invader parks his car in the neighbors' garages. This
is unlike the first and third examples, because there is clearly a
monetary motivation behind the invader's conduct. However, this
is also distinguishable from the fourth example because we cannot
easily fix a price on the invader's gain.
One could try to fix a price for the invader's gain by looking at
the charges of commercial parking garages. The argument would
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run as follows: since the invader avoids the charges of the
commercial garages, his gain from stealing neighbors' property is
equal to the commercial parking fee avoided. Thus, if the
commercial garages charge $25 a day, the invader's gain is $25 for
every invasion.
But this argument is incorrect because the invader's gain is
really equal to the maximum that he is willing to pay to protect his
car. If the invader is willing to pay $50 per day to protect his car,
then his gain is $50 for every invasion. Of course, invading a
neighbor's garage may be costly in some respects. The neighbor
might retaliate violently. The net gain to the invader is the gain he
enjoys from protecting his car, less the expected cost of retaliation
from the neighbor.
Is the wealth of the invader relevant in the determination of a
punitive award in this case? Probably not. The injurer's gain is
determined solely by the market value of the asset he seeks to
protect. The injurer would have little reason to fix a subjective
valuation in excess of the market value of the asset. He would have
little reason, in general, to spend $60,000 to protect an asset that is
worth $50,000.
The message from this example is that when the gain to the
injurer is determined by the value of an asset, and that value is
determined by the market, the injurer's wealth should not be
relevant to the determination of a punitive judgment.
Things become more complicated if the invader experiences a
spiteful pleasure from using the garages of neighbors, as in the first
example. Wealth could be relevant to the determination of the
punitive award in that case.
V. CORPORATIONS AS INJURERS

To this point, I have considered the role of wealth, in the
determination of a punitive judgment, in the context of individual
versus individual lawsuits. What if the defendant is a corporation?
It has been suggested that wealth should play no role in the
determination of a punitive judgment against a corporation. The
reason is that a corporation will be rationally motivated by the
incremental monetary benefits and costs of its actions, and those
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benefits and costs should be independent of the wealth of the
corporation.
One preliminary issue that arises is what it means to take the
wealth of the corporation into account in determining a punitive
judgment. One could measure the wealth of a corporation in a
number of ways-by expenditures, by revenue, or by stock market
capitalization. A firm could have a substantial revenue and a
relatively small stock market capitalization, and vice versa, since
the former is a reflection of current income and the latter is based
on the expected stream of future profits.
The foregoing analysis of individuals applies with only minor
modifications to corporations. The most important modification
concerns motives. It seems fair to assume that corporations are
rationally motivated by the monetary benefits and costs of their
proposed actions, and not by the desire to experience a spiteful
pleasure in injuring someone. In analyzing the corporation, I will
assume that it does not act out of the noneconomic motivations that
sometimes direct the conduct of individuals. A scenario in which
the injurer destroys the property of the victim in order to derive
pleasure from inflicting a loss on the victim will not be considered
in this discussion as a plausible one for a corporation.
Although corporations are motivated by rational economic
interests, this does not mean that they never engage in the type of
conduct that should be completely deterred. A rational,
economically motivated actor, such as a corporation, may choose
to steal the property of another. The proper remedy for theft is a
gain-stripping penalty that completely deters the activity.
Assume then, that a corporation steals the property of some
victim, perhaps an individual or another corporation. The optimal
penalty would strip the gains to the corporation from the theft of
the property. The gain can be measured directly by the
corporation's valuation or willingness to pay for the stolen
property.
The corporation's valuation of a parcel of property will be
based on the expected stream of profits that can be attributed to
ownership of the property. Suppose the property is a tract of land
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containing oil reserves. 19 Suppose the oil reserves, under the
management of the corporation, are expected to generate a stream
of profits of $100,000 every year. If the interest rate is five percent,
the net present value of the profit stream will be $2 million. Thus,
the corporation's gain from stealing the property will be $2 million.
The gain-stripping penalty should be at least $2 million.
As this example suggests, the gain to the corporation in a
routine taking will be determined by the profitability of the taking.
The profitability of the taking, rather than corporate wealth, is the
key determinant of the optimal punitive judgment. As long as the
profits attributable to the corporation's theft can be observed and
measured, there is no need to consider any measure of the
corporation's wealth in the determination of an optimal punitive
judgment.
This conclusion may seem to support the broad claim that
wealth is irrelevant in the determination of a punitive judgment
against a corporation. In a strict sense, this is true. The profitability
of the corporation's act, not its wealth, is the key determinant of the
optimal punitive judgment. However, some measure of corporate
wealth may become relevant in the determination of a punitive
judgment when the profitability of the corporation's act is not
directly observable and the wealth measure is correlatedwith the
profitabilityof the act.
For example, suppose the corporation commits fraud against a
targeted group of consumers accounting for ten percent of its
revenue. Suppose also that the profits from the corporation's
commission of fraud are difficult to determine, since it would
require information on unit costs and transaction prices. A punitive
judgment that strips the corporation of ten percent of its profit
during the period of the fraud would appear to be a reasonable
estimate of the gain-eliminating penalty.
In this example, it might appear to some observers that a
measure of the corporation's wealth-profits during the period of
fraud-is being used to determine the appropriate punitive
judgment; in other words, that the corporation is being punished on
the basis of its wealth. Such an interpretation would be literally
19For a real case involving theft of land containing oil reserves, see TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
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valid, but at the same time a misleading distortion of the process
by which the punitive judgment was determined.
Admittedly, punitive judgments that tax a corporation on the
basis of its profits are capable of being abused. Lawyers for
plaintiffs will advocate for such awards on the ground that a
"wealthy corporation" should not be allowed to get away with
wrongdoing. However, there is also the potential for abuse from
the defense side, as lawyers for defendants attempt to discredit
such judgments as based on redistributive, rather than punishment,
aims. However, the fact that lawyers might abuse the rules that
permit such judgments is an argument for greater clarity with
respect to the purposes of punitive awards within the courts, not for
attempting to sever any connection between defendants' wealth and
punitive judgments.
In addition to furthering the optimal deterrence goal in certain
cases, punitive judgments that tax a corporation's profits serve
desirable administrative ends. First, they spare the court the task of
attempting to determine the profitability of the corporate
defendant's acts on a micro-economic level. Even if the
information necessary to determine profitability were available, it
might require a team of econometricians to arrive at accurate
estimates of profitability. Second, given that the information
necessary to determine the profitability of the corporate
defendant's acts is often not available, a punitive judgment that
taxes the corporation's overall profits provides the corporation with
an incentive to reveal the information on the specific gain directly
to the court.
Viewed from an administrative perspective, the practice of
taxing corporate profits can be seen as analogous to common law
evidence rules, such as res ipsa loquitor. Under the res ipsa
doctrine, a court will infer negligence, unless the defendant can
come to court with evidence disproving negligence. The res ipsa
doctrine shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the
defendant under certain conditions, in part to provide the defendant
with an incentive to bring evidence into court. The practice of
taxing corporate profits is effectively a burden-shifting rule in the
punitive damages context. The defendant can avoid having to pay a
percentage of its overall profits if it comes to court with the
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evidence on the specific gains from the acts meriting punitive
liability.
Under an ideal system, the corporation would choose to pay
the tax declared by the court or offer evidence that its specific
gains were less than the amount of the tax. If the firm chose to pay
the tax, then one could infer that its gains were not substantially
less than the tax (and possibly greater). Of course, we are far from
that ideal now, since corporate defendants are more likely, given
the unstable nature of the law, to challenge an award that taxes
profits as a redistributive taking, rather than come to court with
evidence on their specific gains.
VI. CONCLUSION

The claim that the wealth of the defendant is never relevant to
the setting of an optimally-deterring punitive damages award is
invalid. There are instances in which wealth is not relevant, but
there are also many instances in which information on wealth is
quite useful in the determination of an optimal punitive award. In
general, wealth is not a direct determinant of the size of an optimal
award; there is no reason to think that the wealthy deserve harsher
punishment per se. The factors that directly determine the size of
an optimal award are the losses to society or the gain to the injurer
from a reprehensible act. The defendant's wealth can be relevant to
the determination of an award when these factors are unobservable
and correlated with wealth.

